Estate of
Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904 , 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 165; 24 P.3d 1191
[No.
S087881.
Jun. 21, 2001.]
Estate of DENIS H. GRISWOLD, Deceased.
NORMA B. DONER-GRISWOLD, Petitioner and Respondent, v.
FRANCIS V. SEE, Objector and Appellant.
(Superior Court of Santa Barbara County, No. B216236,
Thomas Pearce Anderle, Judge.)
(The Court of Appeal, Second Dist., Div. Six, No.
B128933, 79
Cal.App.4th 1380.)
(Opinion by Baxter, J., with George, C. J., Kennard,
Werdegar, and Chin, JJ., concurring. Concurring opinion by Brown, J.
(see p. 925).)
COUNSEL
Kitchen & Turpin, David C. Turpin; Law Office of
Herb Fox and Herb Fox for Objector and Appellant.
Mullen & Henzell and Lawrence T. Sorensen for
Petitioner and Respondent. [25 Cal.4th 907]
OPINION
BAXTER, J.-
Section 6452 of the Probate Code (all statutory
references are to this code unless otherwise indicated) bars a "natural
parent" or a relative of that parent from inheriting through a child
born out of wedlock on the basis of the parent and child relationship
unless the parent or relative "acknowledged the child" and "contributed
to the support or the care of the child." In this case, we must
determine whether section 6452 precludes the half siblings of a child
born out of wedlock from sharing in the child's intestate estate where
the record is undisputed that their father appeared in an Ohio court,
admitted paternity of the child, and paid court-ordered child support
until the child was 18 years old. Although the father and the
out-of-wedlock child apparently never met or communicated, and the half
siblings did not learn of the child's existence until after both the
child and the father died, there is no indication that the father ever
denied paternity or knowledge of the out-of-wedlock child to persons
who were aware of the circumstances.
Since succession to estates is purely a matter of
statutory regulation, our resolution of this issue requires that we
ascertain the intent of the lawmakers who enacted section 6452.
Application of settled principles of statutory [25 Cal.4th
908] construction compels us to conclude, on this
uncontroverted record, that section 6452 does not bar the half siblings
from sharing in the decedent's estate.
Factual
and Procedural Background
Denis H. Griswold died intestate in 1996, survived by
his wife, Norma B. Doner-Griswold. Doner-Griswold petitioned for and
received letters of administration and authority to administer
Griswold's modest estate, consisting entirely of separate property.
In 1998, Doner-Griswold filed a petition for final
distribution, proposing a distribution of estate property, after
payment of attorney's fees and costs, to herself as the surviving
spouse and sole heir. Francis V. See, a self-described "forensic
genealogist" (heir hunter) who had obtained an assignment of partial
interest in the Griswold estate from Margaret Loera and Daniel Draves, fn. 1
objected to the petition for final distribution and filed a petition to
determine entitlement to distribution.
See and Doner-Griswold stipulated to the following
background facts pertinent to See's entitlement petition.
Griswold was born out of wedlock to Betty Jane Morris on
July 12, 1941 in Ashland, Ohio. The birth certificate listed his name
as Denis Howard Morris and identified John Edward Draves of New London,
Ohio as the father. A week after the birth, Morris filed a "bastardy
complaint" fn.
2 in the juvenile court in Huron County, Ohio and swore under
oath that Draves was the child's father. In September of 1941, Draves
appeared in the bastardy proceeding and "confessed in Court that the
charge of the plaintiff herein is true." The court adjudged Draves to
be the "reputed father" of the child, and ordered Draves to pay medical
expenses related to Morris's pregnancy as well as $5 per week for child
support and maintenance. Draves complied, and for 18 years paid the
court-ordered support to the clerk of the Huron County court.
Morris married Fred Griswold in 1942 and moved to
California. She began to refer to her son as "Denis Howard Griswold," a
name he used for the rest of his life. For many years, Griswold
believed Fred Griswold was his father. At some point in time, either
after his mother and Fred Griswold [25 Cal.4th 909]
divorced in 1978 or after his mother died in 1983, Griswold learned
that Draves was listed as his father on his birth certificate. So far
as is known, Griswold made no attempt to contact Draves or other
members of the Draves family.
Meanwhile, at some point after Griswold's birth, Draves
married in Ohio and had two children, Margaret and Daniel. Neither
Draves nor these two children had any communication with Griswold, and
the children did not know of Griswold's existence until after
Griswold's death in 1996. Draves died in 1993. His last will and
testament, dated July 22, 1991, made no mention of Griswold by name or
other reference. Huron County probate documents identified Draves's
surviving spouse and two children—Margaret and
Daniel—as the only heirs.
Based upon the foregoing facts, the probate court denied
See's petition to determine entitlement. In the court's view, See had
not demonstrated that Draves was Griswold's "natural parent" or that
Draves "acknowledged" Griswold as his child as required by section 6452.
The Court of Appeal disagreed on both points and
reversed the order of the probate court. We granted Doner-Griswold's
petition for review.
Discussion
[1a] Denis H. Griswold died without a will, and his
estate consists solely of separate property. Consequently, the
intestacy rules codified at sections 6401 and 6402 are implicated.
Section 6401, subdivision (c) provides that a surviving spouse's share
of intestate separate property is one-half "[w]here the decedent leaves
no issue but leaves a parent or parents or their issue or the issue of
either of them." (§ 6401, subd. (c)(2)(B).) Section 6402,
subdivision (c) provides that the portion of the intestate estate not
passing to the surviving spouse under section 6401 passes as follows:
"If there is no surviving issue or parent, to the issue of the parents
or either of them, the issue taking equally if they are all of the same
degree of kinship to the decedent ...."
As noted, Griswold's mother (Betty Jane Morris) and
father (John Draves) both predeceased him. Morris had no issue other
than Griswold and Griswold himself left no issue. Based on these facts,
See contends that Doner-Griswold is entitled to one-half of Griswold's
estate and that Draves's issue (See's assignors, Margaret and Daniel)
are entitled to the other half pursuant to sections 6401 and 6402.
Because Griswold was born out of wedlock, three
additional Probate Code provisions—section 6450, section
6452, and section 6453—must be considered. [25
Cal.4th 910]
As relevant here, section 6450 provides that "a
relationship of parent and child exists for the purpose of determining
intestate succession by, through, or from a person" where "[t]he
relationship of parent and child exists between a person and the
person's natural parents, regardless of the marital status of the
natural parents." (Id., subd. (a).)
Notwithstanding section 6450's general recognition of a
parent and child relationship in cases of unmarried natural parents,
section 6452 restricts the ability of such parents and their relatives
to inherit from a child as follows: "If a child is born out of wedlock,
neither a natural parent nor a relative of that
parent inherits from or through the child on the basis of the parent
and child relationship between that parent and the child unless both of
the following requirements are satisfied: [¶] (a) The parent
or a relative of the parent acknowledged the child.
[¶] (b) The parent or a relative of the parent contributed to
the support or the care of the child." (Italics added.)
Section 6453, in turn, articulates the criteria for
determining whether a person is a "natural parent" within the meaning
of sections 6450 and 6452. A more detailed discussion of section 6453
appears post, at part B.
It is undisputed here that section 6452 governs the
determination whether Margaret, Daniel, and See (by assignment) are
entitled to inherit from Griswold. It is also uncontroverted that
Draves contributed court-ordered child support for 18 years, thus
satisfying subdivision (b) of section 6452. At issue, however, is
whether the record establishes all the remaining requirements of
section 6452 as a matter of law. First, did Draves acknowledge Griswold
within the meaning of section 6452, subdivision (a)? Second, did the
Ohio judgment of reputed paternity establish Draves as the natural
parent of Griswold within the contemplation of sections 6452 and 6453?
We address these issues in order.
A. Acknowledgement
As indicated, section 6452 precludes a natural parent or
a relative of that parent from inheriting through a child born out of
wedlock unless the parent or relative "acknowledged the child." (Id.,
subd. (a).) On review, we must determine whether Draves acknowledged
Griswold within the contemplation of the statute by confessing to
paternity in court, where the record reflects no other acts of
acknowledgement, but no disavowals either.
[2] In statutory construction cases, our fundamental
task is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate
the purpose of the statute. (Day v. City of Fontana
(2001) 25
Cal.4th 268, 272 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 457, 19 [25
Cal.4th 911] P.3d 1196].) "We begin by examining the
statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning."
(Ibid.; People v. Lawrence
(2000) 24
Cal.4th 219, 230 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 570, 6 P.3d 228].) If the
terms of the statute are unambiguous, we presume the lawmakers meant
what they said, and the plain meaning of the language governs. (Day
v. City of Fontana, supra, 25 Cal.4th at
p. 272; People v. Lawrence, supra,
24 Cal.4th at pp. 230-231.) If there is ambiguity, however, we may then
look to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be
achieved and the legislative history. (Day v. City of Fontana,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 272.) In such cases,
we " ' "select the construction that comports most closely with the
apparent intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather
than defeating the general purpose of the statute, and avoid an
interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences." ' " (Ibid.)
[1b] Section 6452 does not define the word
"acknowledged." Nor does any other provision of the Probate Code. At
the outset, however, we may logically infer that the word refers to
conduct other than that described in subdivision (b) of section 6452,
i.e., contributing to the child's support or care; otherwise,
subdivision (a) of the statute would be surplusage and unnecessary.
Although no statutory definition appears, the common
meaning of "acknowledge" is "to admit to be true or as stated;
confess." (Webster's New World Dict. (2d ed. 1982) p. 12; see Webster's
3d New Internat. Dict. (1981) p. 17 ["to show by word or act that one
has knowledge of and agrees to (a fact or truth) ... [or] concede to be
real or true ... [or] admit"].) Were we to ascribe this common meaning
to the statutory language, there could be no doubt that section 6452's
acknowledgement requirement is met here. As the stipulated record
reflects, Griswold's natural mother initiated a bastardy proceeding in
the Ohio juvenile court in 1941 in which she alleged that Draves was
the child's father. Draves appeared in that proceeding and publicly
"confessed" that the allegation was true. There is no evidence
indicating that Draves did not confess knowingly and voluntarily, or
that he later denied paternity or knowledge of Griswold to those who
were aware of the circumstances. fn. 3 Although the record
establishes that Draves did not speak of Griswold to Margaret and
Daniel, there is no evidence suggesting he sought to actively conceal
the facts from them or anyone else. Under the plain terms of section
6452, the only sustainable conclusion on this record is that Draves
acknowledged Griswold.
Although the facts here do not appear to raise any
ambiguity or uncertainty as to the statute's application, we shall, in
an abundance of caution, [25 Cal.4th 912] test our
conclusion against the general purpose and legislative history of the
statute. (See Day v. City of Fontana, supra,
25 Cal.4th at p. 274; Powers v. City of Richmond
(1995) 10
Cal.4th 85, 93 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 839, 893 P.2d 1160].)
The legislative bill proposing enactment of former
section 6408.5 of the Probate Code (Stats. 1983, ch. 842, §
55, p. 3084; Stats. 1984, ch. 892, § 42, p. 3001), the first
modern statutory forerunner to section 6452, was introduced to
effectuate the Tentative Recommendation Relating to Wills and Intestate
Succession of the California Law Revision Commission (the Commission).
(See 17 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1984) p. 867, referring to 16 Cal.
Law Revision Com. Rep. (1982) p. 2301.) According to the Commission,
which had been solicited by the Legislature to study and recommend
changes to the then existing Probate Code, the proposed comprehensive
legislative package to govern wills, intestate succession, and related
matters would "provide rules that are more likely to carry out the
intent of the testator or, if a person dies without a will, the intent
a decedent without a will is most likely to have had." (16 Cal. Law
Revision Com. Rep., supra, at p. 2319.) The
Commission also advised that the purpose of the legislation was to
"make probate more efficient and expeditious." (Ibid.)
From all that appears, the Legislature shared the Commission's views in
enacting the legislative bill of which former section 6408.5 was a
part. (See 17 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., supra,
at p. 867.)
Typically, disputes regarding parental acknowledgement
of a child born out of wedlock involve factual assertions that are made
by persons who are likely to have direct financial interests in the
child's estate and that relate to events occurring long before the
child's death. Questions of credibility must be resolved without the
child in court to corroborate or rebut the claims of those purporting
to have witnessed the parent's statements or conduct concerning the
child. Recognition that an in-court admission of the parent and child
relationship constitutes powerful evidence of an acknowledgement under
section 6452 would tend to reduce litigation over such matters and
thereby effectuate the legislative objective to "make probate more
efficient and expeditious." (16 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., supra,
at p. 2319.)
Additionally, construing the acknowledgement requirement
to be met in circumstances such as these is neither illogical nor
absurd with respect to the intent of an intestate decedent. Put another
way, where a parent willingly acknowledged paternity in an action
initiated to establish the parent-child relationship and thereafter was
never heard to deny such relationship (§ 6452, subd. (a)), and
where that parent paid all court-ordered support for that child for 18
years (id., subd. (b)), it cannot be said that the
participation [25 Cal.4th 913] of that parent or
his relative in the estate of the deceased child is either (1) so
illogical that it cannot represent the intent that one without a will
is most likely to have had (16 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., supra,
at p. 2319) or (2) "so absurd as to make it manifest that it could not
have been intended" by the Legislature (Estate of De Cigaran
(1907) 150 Cal. 682, 688 [89 P. 833] [construing Civ. Code, former
§ 1388 as entitling the illegitimate half sister of an
illegitimate decedent to inherit her entire intestate separate property
to the exclusion of the decedent's surviving husband]).
There is a dearth of case law pertaining to section 6452
or its predecessor statutes, but what little there is supports the
foregoing construction. Notably, Lozano v. Scalier
(1996) 51
Cal.App.4th 843 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 346] (Lozano),
the only prior decision directly addressing section 6452's
acknowledgement requirement, declined to read the statute as
necessitating more than what its plain terms call for.
In Lozano, the issue was whether the
trial court erred in allowing the plaintiff, who was the natural father
of a 10-month-old child, to pursue a wrongful death action arising out
of the child's accidental death. The wrongful death statute provided
that where the decedent left no spouse or child, such an action may be
brought by the persons "who would be entitled to the property of the
decedent by intestate succession." (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.60,
subd. (a).) Because the child had been born out of wedlock, the
plaintiff had no right to succeed to the estate unless he had both
"acknowledged the child" and "contributed to the support or the care of
the child" as required by section 6452. Lozano
upheld the trial court's finding of acknowledgement in light of
evidence in the record that the plaintiff had signed as "Father" on a
medical form five months before the child's birth and had repeatedly
told family members and others that he was the child's father. (Lozano,
supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at pp. 845, 848.)
Significantly, Lozano rejected
arguments that an acknowledgement under Probate Code section 6452 must
be (1) a witnessed writing and (2) made after the child was born so
that the child is identified. In doing so, Lozano
initially noted there were no such requirements on the face of the
statute. (Lozano, supra, 51
Cal.App.4th at p. 848.) Lozano next looked to the
history of the statute and made two observations in declining to read
such terms into the statutory language. First, even though the
Legislature had previously required a witnessed writing in cases where
an illegitimate child sought to inherit from the father's estate, it
repealed such requirement in 1975 in an apparent effort to ease the
evidentiary proof of the parent-child relationship. (Ibid.)
Second, other statutes that required a parent-child relationship
expressly contained more formal acknowledgement requirements for the
assertion of certain other rights or privileges. (See id.
at p. 849, citing Code Civ. [25 Cal.4th 914] Proc.,
§ 376, subd. (c), Health & Saf. Code, §
102750, & Fam. Code, § 7574.) Had the Legislature
wanted to impose more stringent requirements for an acknowledgement
under section 6452, Lozano reasoned, it certainly
had precedent for doing so. (Lozano, supra,
51 Cal.App.4th at p. 849.)
Apart from Probate Code section 6452, the Legislature
had previously imposed an acknowledgement requirement in the context of
a statute providing that a father could legitimate a child born out of
wedlock for all purposes "by publicly acknowledging it as his own."
(See Civ. Code, former § 230.) fn. 4 Since that statute dealt
with an analogous subject and employed a substantially similar phrase,
we address the case law construing that legislation below.
In Blythe v. Ayres (1892) 96 Cal.
532 [31 P. 915], decided over a century ago, this court determined that
the word "acknowledge," as it appeared in former section 230 of the
Civil Code, had no technical meaning. (Blythe v. Ayers,
supra, 96 Cal. at p. 577.) We therefore
employed the word's common meaning, which was " 'to own or admit the
knowledge of.' " (Ibid. [relying upon Webster's
definition]; see also Estate of Gird (1910) 157
Cal. 534, 542 [108 P. 499].) Not only did that definition endure in
case law addressing legitimation (Estate of Wilson
(1958) 164
Cal.App.2d 385, 388-389 [330 P.2d 452]; see Estate
of Gird, supra, 157 Cal. at pp. 542-543),
but, as discussed, the word retains virtually the same meaning in
general usage today—"to admit to be true or as stated;
confess." (Webster's New World Dict., supra, at p.
12; see Webster's 3d New Internat. Dict., supra, at
p. 17.)
Notably, the decisions construing former section 230 of
the Civil Code indicate that its public acknowledgement requirement
would have been met where a father made a single confession in court to
the paternity of a child.
In Estate of McNamara (1919) 181
Cal. 82 [183 P. 552, 7 A.L.R. 313], for example, we were emphatic in
recognizing that a single unequivocal act could satisfy the
acknowledgement requirement for purposes of statutory legitimation.
Although the record in that case had contained additional evidence of
the father's acknowledgement, we focused our attention on his [25
Cal.4th 915] one act of signing the birth certificate and
proclaimed: "A more public acknowledgement than the act of [the
decedent] in signing the child's birth certificate describing himself
as the father, it would be difficult to imagine." (Id.
at pp. 97-98.)
Similarly, in Estate of Gird, supra,
157 Cal. 534, we indicated in dictum that "a public avowal, made in the
courts" would constitute a public acknowledgement under former section
230 of the Civil Code. (Estate of Gird, supra,
157 Cal. at pp. 542-543.)
Finally, in Wong v. Young (1947) 80
Cal.App.2d 391 [181 P.2d 741], a man's admission of paternity
in a verified pleading, made in an action seeking to have the man
declared the father of the child and for child support, was found to
have satisfied the public acknowledgement requirement of the
legitimation statute. (Id. at pp. 393-394.) Such
admission was also deemed to constitute an acknowledgement under former
Probate Code section 255, which had allowed illegitimate children to
inherit from their fathers under an acknowledgement requirement that
was even more stringent than that contained in Probate Code section
6452. fn. 5
(Wong v. Young, supra, "80
Cal.App.2d at p. 394; see also Estate of De Laveaga
(1904) 142 Cal. 158, 168 [75 P. 790] [indicating in dictum that, under
a predecessor to Probate Code section 255, father sufficiently
acknowledged an illegitimate child in a single witnessed writing
declaring the child as his son].) Ultimately, however, legitimation of
the child under former section 230 of the Civil Code was not found
because two other of the statute's express requirements, i.e., receipt
of the child into the father's family and the father's otherwise
treating the child as his legitimate child (see ante,
fn. 4), had not been established. (Wong v. Young, supra,
"80 Cal.App.2d at p. 394.)
Although the foregoing authorities did not involve
section 6452, their views on parental acknowledgement of out-of-wedlock
children were part of the legal landscape when the first modern
statutory forerunner to that provision was enacted in 1985. (See former
§ 6408.5, added by Stats. 1983, ch. 842, § 55, p.
3084, and amended by Stats. 1984, ch. 892, § 42, p. 3001.) [3]
Where, as here, legislation has been judicially construed and a
subsequent statute on the same or an analogous subject uses identical
or substantially similar language, we may presume that the Legislature
intended the [25 Cal.4th 916] same construction,
unless a contrary intent clearly appears. (In re Jerry R.
(1994) 29
Cal.App.4th 1432, 1437 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 155]; see also People
v. Masbruch (1996) 13
Cal.4th 1001, 1007 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 760, 920 P.2d 705]; Belridge
Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1978) 21
Cal.3d 551, 557 [147 Cal.Rptr. 165, 580 P.2d 665].) [1c]
Since no evidence of a contrary intent clearly appears, we may
reasonably infer that the types of acknowledgement formerly deemed
sufficient for the legitimation statute (and former § 255, as
well) suffice for purposes of intestate succession under section 6452. fn. 6
Doner-Griswold disputes whether the acknowledgement
required by Probate Code section 6452 may be met by a father's single
act of acknowledging a child in court. In her view, the requirement
contemplates a situation where the father establishes an ongoing
parental relationship with the child or otherwise acknowledges the
child's existence to his subsequent wife and children. To support this
contention, she relies on three other authorities addressing
acknowledgement under former section 230 of the Civil Code: Blythe
v. Ayers, supra, 96 Cal. 532, Estate
of Wilson, supra, 164
Cal.App.2d 385, and Estate of Maxey
(1967) 257
Cal.App.2d 391 [64 Cal.Rptr. 837].
In Blythe v. Ayres, supra,
96 Cal. 532, the father never saw his illegitimate child because she
resided in another country with her mother. Nevertheless, he "was
garrulous upon the subject" of his paternity and "it was his common
topic of conversation." (Id. at p. 577.) Not only
did the father declare the child to be his child, "to all persons, upon
all occasions," but at his request the child was named and baptized
with his surname. (Ibid.) Based on the foregoing,
this court remarked that "it could almost be held that he shouted it
from the house-tops." (Ibid.) Accordingly, we
concluded that the father's public acknowledgement under former section
230 of the Civil Code could "hardly be considered debatable." (Blythe
v. Ayres, supra, 96 Cal. at p. 577.)
In Estate of Wilson, supra,
164
Cal.App.2d 385, the evidence showed that the father had
acknowledged to his wife that he was the father of a child born to
another woman. (Id. at p. 389.) Moreover, he had
introduced the child as his own on many occasions, including at the
funeral of his mother. (Ibid.) In light of such
evidence, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's finding that the
father had publicly acknowledged the child within the contemplation of
the legitimation statute. [25 Cal.4th 917]
In Estate of Maxey, supra,
257
Cal.App.2d 391, the Court of Appeal found ample evidence
supporting the trial court's determination that the father publicly
acknowledged his illegitimate son for purposes of legitimation. The
father had, on several occasions, visited the house where the child
lived with his mother and asked about the child's school attendance and
general welfare. (Id. at p. 397.) The father also,
in the presence of others, had asked for permission to take the child
to his own home for the summer, and, when that request was refused,
said that the child was his son and that he should have the child part
of the time. (Ibid.) In addition, the father had
addressed the child as his son in the presence of other persons. (Ibid.)
Doner-Griswold correctly points out that the foregoing
decisions illustrate the principle that the existence of
acknowledgement must be decided on the circumstances of each case. (Estate
of Baird (1924) 193 Cal. 225, 277 [223 P. 974].) In those
decisions, however, the respective fathers had not confessed to
paternity in a legal action. Consequently, the courts looked to what
other forms of public acknowledgement had been demonstrated by fathers.
(See also Lozano, supra, 51
Cal.App.4th 843 [examining father's acts both before and
after child's birth in ascertaining acknowledgement under §
6452].)
That those decisions recognized the validity of
different forms of acknowledgement should not detract from the
weightiness of a father's in-court acknowledgement of a child in an
action seeking to establish the existence of a parent and child
relationship. (See Estate of Gird, supra,
157 Cal. at pp. 542-543; Wong v. Young, supra,
"80 Cal.App.2d at pp. 393-394.) As aptly noted by the Court of Appeal
below, such an acknowledgement is a critical one that typically leads
to a paternity judgment and a legally enforceable obligation of
support. Accordingly, such acknowledgements carry as much, if not
greater, significance than those made to certain select persons (Estate
of Maxey, supra, "257 Cal.App.2d at p.
397) or "shouted ... from the house-tops" (Blythe v. Ayres,
supra, 96 Cal. at p. 577).
Doner-Griswold's authorities do not persuade us that
section 6452 should be read to require that a father have personal
contact with his out-of-wedlock child, that he make purchases for the
child, that he receive the child into his home and other family, or
that he treat the child as he does his other children. First and
foremost, the language of section 6452 does not support such
requirements. (See Lozano, supra,
51 Cal.App.4th at p. 848.) [4] We may not, under the guise of
interpretation, insert qualifying provisions not included in the
statute. (California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City
of Los Angeles (1995) 11
Cal.4th 342, 349 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 279, 902 P.2d 297].)
[1d] Second, even though Blythe v. Ayres,
supra, 96 Cal. 532, Estate of Wilson,
supra, 164
Cal.App.2d 385, and Estate of Maxey, supra,
257 [25 Cal.4th 918] Cal.App.2d 391, variously
found such factors significant for purposes of legitimation, their
reasoning appeared to flow directly from the express terms of the
controlling statute. In contrast to Probate Code section 6452, former
section 230 of the Civil Code provided that the legitimation of a child
born out of wedlock was dependent upon three distinct conditions: (1)
that the father of the child "publicly acknowledg[e] it as his own";
(2) that he "receiv[e] it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he
is married, into his family"; and (3) that he "otherwise treat[] it as
if it were a legitimate child." (Ante, fn. 4; see Estate
of De Laveaga, supra, 142 Cal. at pp.
168-169 [indicating that although father acknowledged his illegitimate
son in a single witnessed writing, legitimation statute was not
satisfied because the father never received the child into his family
and did not treat the child as if he were legitimate].) That the
legitimation statute contained such explicit requirements, while
section 6452 requires only a natural parent's acknowledgement of the
child and contribution toward the child's support or care, strongly
suggests that the Legislature did not intend for the latter provision
to mirror the former in all the particulars identified by
Doner-Griswold. (See Lozano, supra,
51 Cal.App.4th at pp. 848-849; compare with Fam. Code, § 7611,
subd. (d) [a man is "presumed" to be the natural father of a child if
"[h]e receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child
as his natural child"].)
In an attempt to negate the significance of Draves's
in-court confession of paternity, Doner-Griswold emphasizes the
circumstance that Draves did not tell his two other children of
Griswold's existence. The record here, however, stands in sharp
contrast to the primary authority she offers on this point. Estate
of Baird, supra, 193 Cal. 225, held there
was no public acknowledgement under former section 230 of the Civil
Code where the decedent admitted paternity of a child to the child's
mother and their mutual acquaintances but actively concealed the
child's existence and his relationship to the child's mother from his
own mother and sister, with whom he had intimate and affectionate
relations. In that case, the decedent not only failed to tell his
relatives, family friends, and business associates of the child (193
Cal. at p. 252), but he affirmatively denied paternity to a half
brother and to the family coachman (id. at p. 277).
In addition, the decedent and the child's mother masqueraded under a
fictitious name they assumed and gave to the child in order to keep the
decedent's mother and siblings in ignorance of the relationship. (Id.
at pp. 260-261.) In finding that a public acknowledgement had not been
established on such facts, Estate of Baird stated:
"A distinction will be recognized between a mere failure to disclose or
publicly acknowledge paternity and a willful misrepresentation in
regard to it; in such circumstances there must be no purposeful
concealment of the fact of paternity." (Id. at p.
276.) [25 Cal.4th 919]
Unlike the situation in Estate of Baird,
Draves confessed to paternity in a formal legal proceeding. There is no
evidence that Draves thereafter disclaimed his relationship to Griswold
to people aware of the circumstances (see ante, fn.
3), or that he affirmatively denied he was Griswold's father despite
his confession of paternity in the Ohio court proceeding. Nor is there
any suggestion that Draves engaged in contrivances to prevent the
discovery of Griswold's existence. In light of the obvious
dissimilarities, Doner-Griswold's reliance on Estate of Baird
is misplaced.
Estate of Ginochio, supra,
43
Cal.App.3d 412, likewise, is inapposite. That case held that
a judicial determination of paternity following a vigorously contested
hearing did not establish an acknowledgement sufficient to allow an
illegitimate child to inherit under section 255 of the former Probate
Code. (See ante, fn. 5.) Although the court noted
that the decedent ultimately paid the child support ordered by the
court, it emphasized the circumstance that the decedent was declared
the child's father against his will and at no time
did he admit he was the father, or sign any writing acknowledging
publicly or privately such fact, or otherwise have contact with the
child. (Estate of Ginochio, supra,
43 Cal.App.3d at pp. 416-417.) Here, by contrast, Draves did not
contest paternity, vigorously or otherwise. Instead, Draves stood
before the court and openly admitted the parent and child relationship,
and the record discloses no evidence that he subsequently disavowed
such admission to anyone with knowledge of the circumstances. On this
record, section 6452's acknowledgement requirement has been satisfied
by a showing of what Draves did and did not do, not by the mere fact
that paternity had been judicially declared.
Finally, Doner-Griswold contends that a 1996 amendment
of section 6452 evinces the Legislature's unmistakable intent that a
decedent's estate may not pass to siblings who had no contact with, or
were totally unknown to, the decedent. As we shall explain, that
contention proves too much.
Prior to 1996, section 6452 and a predecessor statute,
former section 6408, expressly provided that their terms did not apply
to "a natural brother or a sister of the child" born out of wedlock. fn. 7
In construing former section 6408, Estate of Corcoran
(1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 1099 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 475] held that a half sibling
was a "natural brother or sister" within the meaning of such [25
Cal.4th 920] exception. That holding effectively allowed a
half sibling and the issue of another half sibling to inherit from a
decedent's estate where there had been no parental acknowledgement or
support of the decedent as ordinarily required. In direct response to Estate
of Corcoran, the Legislature amended section 6452 by
eliminating the exception for natural siblings and their issue. (Stats.
1996, ch. 862, § 15; see Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of
Assem. Bill No. 2751 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 3, 1996,
pp. 17-18 (Assembly Bill No. 2751).) According to legislative
documents, the Commission had recommended deletion of the statutory
exception because it "creates an undesirable risk that the estate of
the deceased out-of-wedlock child will be claimed by siblings with whom
the decedent had no contact during lifetime, and of whose existence the
decedent was unaware." (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem.
Bill No. 2751 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 22, 1996, p. 6;
see also Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2751, supra,
at pp. 17-18.)
This legislative history does not compel
Doner-Griswold's construction of section 6452. Reasonably read, the
comments of the Commission merely indicate its concern over the
"undesirable risk" that unknown siblings could rely on the statutory
exception to make claims against estates. Neither the language nor the
history of the statute, however, evinces a clear intent to make
inheritance contingent upon the decedent's awareness of or contact with
such relatives. (See Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill
No. 2751, supra, at p. 6; see also Sen. Com. on
Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2751, supra,
at pp. 17-18.) Indeed, had the Legislature intended to categorically
preclude intestate succession by a natural parent or a relative of that
parent who had no contact with or was unknown to the deceased child, it
could easily have so stated. Instead, by deleting the statutory
exception for natural siblings, thereby subjecting siblings to section
6452's dual requirements of acknowledgement and support, the
Legislature acted to prevent sibling inheritance under the type of
circumstances presented in Estate of Corcoran, supra,
7
Cal.App.4th 1099, and to substantially reduce the risk noted
by the Commission. fn.
8 [25 Cal.4th 921]
B. Requirement
of a Natural Parent and Child Relationship
[5a] Section 6452 limits the ability of a "natural
parent" or "a relative of that parent" to inherit from or through the
child "on the basis of the parent and child relationship between that
parent and the child."
Probate Code section 6453 restricts the means by which a
relationship of a natural parent to a child may be established for
purposes of intestate succession. fn. 9 (See Estate of
Sanders (1992) 2
Cal.App.4th 462, 474-475 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 536].) Under section
6453, subdivision (a), a natural parent and child relationship is
established where the relationship is presumed under the Uniform
Parentage Act and not rebutted. (Fam. Code, § 7600 et seq.) It
is undisputed, however, that none of those presumptions applies in this
case.
Alternatively, and as relevant here, under Probate Code
section 6453, subdivision (b), a natural parent and child relationship
may be established pursuant to section 7630, subdivision (c) of the
Family Code, fn.
10 if a court order was entered during the father's lifetime
declaring paternity. fn. 11 (§ 6453, subd.
(b)(1).)
See contends the question of Draves's paternity was
fully and finally adjudicated in the 1941 bastardy proceeding in Ohio.
That proceeding, he [25 Cal.4th 922] argues,
satisfies both the Uniform Parentage Act and the Probate Code, and
should be binding on the parties here.
If a valid judgment of paternity is rendered in Ohio, it
generally is binding on California courts if Ohio had jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject matter, and the parties were given
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. (Ruddock v.
Ohls (1979) 91
Cal.App.3d 271, 276 [154 Cal.Rptr. 87].) California courts
generally recognize the importance of a final determination of
paternity. (E.g., Weir v. Ferreira (1997) 59
Cal.App.4th 1509, 1520 [70 Cal.Rptr.2d 33] (Weir);
Guardianship of Claralyn S. (1983) 148
Cal.App.3d 81, 85 [195 Cal.Rptr. 646]; cf. Estate
of Camp (1901) 131 Cal. 469, 471 [63 P. 736] [same for
adoption determinations].)
Doner-Griswold does not dispute that the parties here
are in privity with, or claim inheritance through, those who are bound
by the bastardy judgment or are estopped from attacking it. (See Weir,
supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1516-1517, 1521.)
Instead, she contends See has not shown that the issue adjudicated in
the Ohio bastardy proceeding is identical to the issue presented here,
that is, whether Draves was the natural parent of Griswold.
Although we have found no California case directly on
point, one Ohio decision has recognized that a bastardy judgment
rendered in Ohio in 1950 was res judicata of any proceeding that might
have been brought under the Uniform Parentage Act. (Birman v.
Sproat (1988) 47 Ohio App.3d 65 [546 N.E.2d 1354, 1357]
[child born out of wedlock had standing to bring will contest based
upon a paternity determination in a bastardy proceeding brought during
testator's life]; see also Black's Law Dict., supra,
at pp. 146, 1148 [equating a bastardy proceeding with a paternity
suit].) Yet another Ohio decision found that parentage proceedings,
which had found a decedent to be the "reputed father" of a child, fn. 12
satisfied an Ohio legitimation statute and conferred standing upon the
illegitimate child to contest the decedent's will where the
father-child relationship was established prior to the decedent's
death. (Beck v. Jolliff (1984) 22 Ohio App.3d 84
[489 N.E.2d 825, 829]; see also Estate of Hicks
(1993) 90 Ohio App.3d 483 [629 N.E.2d 1086, 1088-1089] [parentage issue
must be determined prior to the father's death to the extent the
parent-child relationship is being established under the chapter
governing descent and distribution].) While we are not bound to follow
these Ohio authorities, they persuade us that the 1941 bastardy
proceeding decided the identical issue presented here.
Next, Doner-Griswold argues the Ohio judgment should not
be given res judicata effect because the bastardy proceeding was
quasi-criminal in nature. [25 Cal.4th 923] It is
her position that Draves's confession may have reflected only a
decision to avoid a jury trial instead of an adjudication of the
paternity issue on the merits.
To support this argument, Doner-Griswold relies upon Pease
v. Pease (1988) 201
Cal.App.3d 29 [246 Cal.Rptr. 762] (Pease).
In that case, a grandfather was sued by his grandchildren and others in
a civil action alleging the grandfather's molestation of the
grandchildren. When the grandfather cross-complained against his former
wife for apportionment of fault, she filed a demurrer contending that
the grandfather was collaterally estopped from asserting the negligent
character of his acts by virtue of his guilty plea in a criminal
proceeding involving the same issues. On appeal, the judgment
dismissing the cross-complaint was reversed. [6] The appellate court
reasoned that a trial court in a civil proceeding may not give
collateral estoppel effect to a criminal conviction involving the same
issues if the conviction resulted from a guilty plea. "The issue of
appellant's guilt was not fully litigated in the prior criminal
proceeding; rather, appellant's plea bargain may reflect nothing more
than a compromise instead of an ultimate determination of his guilt.
Appellant's due process right to a hearing thus outweighs any
countervailing need to limit litigation or conserve judicial
resources." (Id. at p. 34, fn. omitted.)
[5b] Even assuming, for purposes of argument only, that Pease's
reasoning may properly be invoked where the father's admission of
paternity occurred in a bastardy proceeding (see Reams v.
State ex rel. Favors (1936) 53 Ohio App. 19 [6 Ohio Op. 501,
4 N.E.2d 151, 152] [indicating that a bastardy proceeding is more civil
than criminal in character]), the circumstances here do not call for
its application. Unlike the situation in Pease,
neither the in-court admission nor the resulting paternity judgment at
issue is being challenged by the father (Draves). Moreover, neither the
father, nor those claiming a right to inherit through him, seek to
litigate the paternity issue. Accordingly, the father's due process
rights are not at issue and there is no need to determine whether such
rights might outweigh any countervailing need to limit litigation or
conserve judicial resources. (See Pease, supra,
201 Cal.App.3d at p. 34.)
Additionally, the record fails to support any claim that
Draves's confession merely reflected a compromise. Draves, of course,
is no longer living and can offer no explanation as to why he admitted
paternity in the bastardy proceeding. Although Doner-Griswold suggests
that Draves confessed to avoid the publicity of a jury trial, and not
because the paternity charge had merit, that suggestion is purely
speculative and finds no evidentiary support in the record. [25
Cal.4th 924]
Finally, Doner-Griswold argues that See and Griswold's
half siblings do not have standing to seek the requisite paternity
determination pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act under section 7630,
subdivision (c) of the Family Code. The question here, however, is
whether the judgment in the bastardy proceeding initiated by Griswold's
mother forecloses Doner-Griswold's relitigation of the parentage issue.
Although Griswold's mother was not acting pursuant to
the Uniform Parentage Act when she filed the bastardy complaint in
1941, neither that legislation nor the Probate Code provision should be
construed to ignore the force and effect of the judgment she obtained.
That Griswold's mother brought her action to determine paternity long
before the adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act, and that all
procedural requirements of an action under Family Code section 7630 may
not have been followed, should not detract from its binding effect in
this probate proceeding where the issue adjudicated was identical with
the issue that would have been presented in a Uniform Parentage Act
action. (See Weir, supra, 59
Cal.App.4th at p. 1521.) Moreover, a prior adjudication of paternity
does not compromise a state's interests in the accurate and efficient
disposition of property at death. (See Trimble v. Gordon
(1977) 430 U.S. 762, 772 & fn. 14 [97 S.Ct. 1459, 1466, 52
L.Ed.2d 31] [striking down a provision of a state probate act that
precluded a category of illegitimate children from participating in
their intestate fathers' estates where the parent-child relationship
had been established in state court paternity actions prior to the
fathers' deaths].)
In sum, we find that the 1941 Ohio judgment was a court
order "entered during the father's lifetime declaring paternity"
(§ 6453, subd. (b)(1)), and that it establishes Draves as the
natural parent of Griswold for purposes of intestate succession under
section 6452.
Disposition
[7] " 'Succession to estates is purely a matter of
statutory regulation, which cannot be changed by the courts.' " (Estate
of De Cigaran, supra, 150 Cal. at p.
688.) We do not disagree that a natural parent who does no more than
openly acknowledge a child in court and pay court-ordered child support
may not reflect a particularly worthy predicate for inheritance by that
parent's issue, but section 6452 provides in unmistakable language that
it shall be so. While the Legislature remains free to reconsider the
matter and may choose to change the rules of succession at any time,
this court will not do so under the pretense of interpretation.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.
George, C. J., Kennard, J., Werdegar, J., and Chin, J.,
concurred. [25 Cal.4th 925]
CONCURRING OPINION:
BROWN, J.-
I reluctantly concur. The relevant case law strongly
suggests that a father who admits paternity in court with no subsequent
disclaimers "acknowledge[s] the child" within the meaning of
subdivision (a) of Probate Code section 6452. Moreover, neither the
statutory language nor the legislative history supports an alternative
interpretation. Accordingly, we must affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeal.
Nonetheless, I believe our holding today contravenes the
overarching purpose behind our laws of intestate
succession—to carry out "the intent a decedent without a will
is most likely to have had." (16 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1982) p.
2319.) I doubt most children born out of wedlock would have wanted to
bequeath a share of their estate to a "father" who never contacted
them, never mentioned their existence to his family and friends, and
only paid court-ordered child support. I doubt even more that these
children would have wanted to bequeath a share of their estate to that
father's other offspring. Finally, I have no doubt
that most, if not all, children born out of wedlock would have balked
at bequeathing a share of their estate to a "forensic genealogist."
To avoid such a dubious outcome in the future, I believe
our laws of intestate succession should allow a parent to inherit from
a child born out of wedlock only if the parent has some sort of
parental connection to that child. For example, requiring a parent to
treat a child born out of wedlock as the parent's own before the parent
may inherit from that child would prevent today's outcome. (See, e.g., Bullock
v. Thomas (Miss. 1995) 659 So.2d 574, 577 [a father must
"openly treat" a child born out of wedlock "as his own" in order to
inherit from that child].) More importantly, such a requirement would
comport with the stated purpose behind our laws of succession because
that child likely would have wanted to give a share of his estate to a
parent that treated him as the parent's own.
Of course, this court may not remedy this apparent
defect in our intestate succession statutes. Only the Legislature may
make the appropriate revisions. I urge it to do so here.
FN
1. California permits heirs to assign their interests in an
estate, but such assignments are subject to court scrutiny. (See
§ 11604.)
FN
2. A "bastardy proceeding" is an archaic term for a paternity
suit. (Black's Law Dict. (7th ed. 1999) pp. 146, 1148.)
FN
3. Huron County court documents indicate that at least two
people other than Morris, one of whom appears to have been a relative
of Draves, had knowledge of the bastardy proceeding.
FN
4. Former section 230 of the Civil Code provided: "The father
of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own,
receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is married,
into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate
child, thereby adopts it as such; and such child is thereupon deemed
for all purposes legitimate from the time of its birth. The foregoing
provisions of this Chapter do not apply to such an adoption." (Enacted
1 Cal. Civ. Code (1872) § 230, p. 68, repealed by Stats. 1975,
ch. 1244, § 8, p. 3196.)
In 1975, the Legislature enacted California's Uniform
Parentage Act, which abolished the concept of legitimacy and replaced
it with the concept of parentage. (See Adoption of Kelsey S.
(1992) 1
Cal.4th 816, 828-829 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 823 P.2d 1216].)
FN
5. Section 255 of the former Probate Code provided in
pertinent part: " 'Every illegitimate child, whether born or conceived
but unborn, in the event of his subsequent birth, is an heir of his
mother, and also of the person who, in writing, signed in the presence
of a competent witness, acknowledges himself to be the father, and
inherits his or her estate, in whole or in part, as the case may be, in
the same manner as if he had been born in lawful wedlock ....' " (Estate
of Ginochio (1974) 43
Cal.App.3d 412, 416 [117 Cal.Rptr. 565], italics omitted.)
FN
6. Probate Code section 6452's acknowledgement requirement
differs from that found in former section 230 of the Civil Code, in
that section 6452 does not require a parent to "publicly" acknowledge a
child born out of wedlock. That difference, however, fails to accrue to
Doner-Griswold's benefit. If anything, it suggests that the
acknowledgement contemplated in section 6452 encompasses a broader
spectrum of conduct than that associated with the legitimation statute.
FN
7. Former section 6408, subdivision (d) provided: "If a child
is born out of wedlock, neither a parent nor a relative of a parent
(except for the issue of the child or a natural brother or
sister of the child or the issue of that brother or sister)
inherits from or through the child on the basis of the relationship of
parent and child between that parent and child unless both of the
following requirements are satisfied: [¶] (1) The parent or a
relative of the parent acknowledged the child. [¶] (2) The
parent or a relative of the parent contributed to the support or the
care of the child." (Stats. 1990, ch. 79, § 14, p. 722,
italics added.)
FN
8. We observe that, under certain former versions of Ohio
law, a father's confession of paternity in an Ohio juvenile court
proceeding was not the equivalent of a formal probate court
"acknowledgement" that would have allowed an illegitimate child to
inherit from the father in that state. (See Estate of Vaughan
(2001) 90 Ohio St.3d 544 [740 N.E.2d 259, 262-263].) Here, however,
Doner-Griswold does not dispute that the right of the succession
claimants to succeed to Griswold's property is governed by the law of
Griswold's domicile, i.e., California law, not the law of the
claimants' domicile or the law of the place where Draves's
acknowledgement occurred. (Civ. Code, §§ 755, 946;
see Estate of Lund (1945) 26
Cal.2d 472, 493-496 [159 P.2d 643, 162 A.L.R. 606] [where
father died domiciled in California, his out-of-wedlock son could
inherit where all the legitimation requirements of former §
230 of the Civ. Code were met, even though the acts of legitimation
occurred while the father and son were domiciled in two other states
wherein such acts were not legally sufficient].)
FN
9. Section 6453 provides in full: "For the purpose of
determining whether a person is a 'natural parent' as that term is used
is this chapter: [¶] (a) A natural parent and child
relationship is established where that relationship is presumed and not
rebutted pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act, Part 3 (commencing with
Section 7600) of Division 12 of the Family Code. [¶] (b) A
natural parent and child relationship may be established pursuant to
any other provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act, except that the
relationship may not be established by an action under subdivision (c)
of Section 7630 of the Family Code unless any of the following
conditions exist: [¶] (1) A court order was entered during the
father's lifetime declaring paternity. [¶] (2) Paternity is
established by clear and convincing evidence that the father has openly
held out the child as his own. [¶] (3) It was impossible for
the father to hold out the child as his own and paternity is
established by clear and convincing evidence."
FN
10. Family Code section 7630, subdivision (c) provides in
pertinent part: "An action to determine the existence of the father and
child relationship with respect to a child who has no presumed father
under Section 7611 ... may be brought by the child or personal
representative of the child, the Department of Child Support Services,
the mother or the personal representative or a parent of the mother if
the mother has died or is a minor, a man alleged or alleging himself to
be the father, or the personal representative or a parent of the
alleged father if the alleged father has died or is a minor. An action
under this subdivision shall be consolidated with a proceeding pursuant
to Section 7662 if a proceeding has been filed under Chapter 5
(commencing with Section 7660). The parental rights of the alleged
natural father shall be determined as set forth in Section 7664."
FN
11. See makes no attempt to establish Draves's natural parent
status under other provisions of section 6453, subdivision (b).
FN
12. The term "reputed father" appears to have reflected the
language of the relevant Ohio statute at or about the time of the 1941
bastardy proceeding. (See State ex rel. Discus v. Van Dorn
(1937) 56 Ohio App. 82 [8 Ohio Op. 393, 10 N.E.2d 14, 16].)
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